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Abstract 
Special interest in designing, constructing and exploitation of fault tolerant systems is 
connected with the need of attending to critical infrastructure systems. In this paper we focus on 
presentation and analysis of the requirements demanded on the context of fault tolerance assurance 
in the critical infrastructure systems. Especially, we take into consideration algorithmical and 
topological methods of fault tolerance assurance. 
 
1. Introduction 
In term of fault tolerant systems we describe these computer systems, among 
others, which despite faults in their hardware or software module still preserve 
their abilities to function in the whole or limited range. Problems of improper 
functioning includes the three main terms: failure, fault and error. Failure refers 
to an occurrence of the system of physical module damages. Fault is a condition 
existing in a hardware or software module that may lead to the failure of the 
module. Error is an incorrect response from hardware or software module 
caused by the existence of faults [1]. 
Faults may occur on different designing or exploitation levels. The highest 
level on which possible functioning faults may arise is the specification level 
when as a result of the designer’s mistake during system designing an improper 
algorithmical, architectural or structural solutions were used. The next level on 
which possible faults may occur is the level of specifications realization. These 
faults  are related with improper implementation of earlier worked out 
specification on hardware or software system modules. Another level of the 
faults occurrence is the production and exploitation level on which failure of one 
or a few system modules can take place mostly as a result of not obeying the 
specification and exploitation parameters. Obviously faults may also occur as a 
result of outer factors such as radiation, electromagnetic field or operator 
mistakes.   
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From the activities point of view whose aim is to minimize the damaging 
effects to the system functioning we can distinguish three fundamentally 
different approaches. Fault avoidance is based on supplying the system with the 
elements allowing, on the basis of the functioning results, analysis and system 
modules diagnosis to counteract arising of potential functioning errors. Fault 
masking is based on excluding system elements which are the source of errors. 
Fault tolerance is the system ability to continue computations in the faulty 
system. Fault tolerance can take advantage of fault masking as well as system 
reconfiguration [2]. 
In our work we consider only the topology reliability. The main requirements 
for fault tolerant topology can be formulated as follows:  
1. Topology should ensure the required level of fault tolerance without any 
excessive increase of its realization costs. 
2. Topology should ensure the ability to decentralize the system diagnostic 
methods using relatively simple means. 
3. Topology should ensure the ability of simple routing of sent information 
with the mineralized level of hardware support.    
From the topological point of view the topology designing procedure reduces 
to the assurance of minimal product value of diameter and designed topology 
degree. In other words, parameters characterizing the topology fault tolerance 
are their survivability and cohesion. 
In this paper we focus not so much on designing procedures of fault tolerant 
systems as on the methods and means of system reconfiguration in order to 
preserve qualitative and quantitative system characteristics.     
 
2. The critical infrastructure systems, and fault tolerance  
The limited level of survivability and cohesion characterizes all contemporary 
computer systems. It results from the fact that each of currently used system 
elements or programs may yield to a fault as a result of improper use, mistakes 
made in a designing procedure wear out, etc. The elements of computer structure 
are duplicated in time, hardware and information in order to eliminate or 
minimize the effects of the faults occurrence. In this way, fault tolerant 
structures come into being which in the case of faults occurrence makes that 
structure preserves its functions in the whole or limited range.  
Among the computer systems we can distinguish a varied failure treatment. 
On the one hand, there exists systems in which limited realization of system 
functions for example in the efficiency range does not make using of its 
resources difficult. But there exists the whole group of systems in which 
determination of the efficiency parameters in particular limitation of system 
functions is unacceptable. The management systems of electric power networks, 
air or railway transportation are an example of such systems. Such systems are 
often called critical infrastructure systems. Special interest in designing, 
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constructing and exploitation of fault tolerant systems is connected with a need 
of attending to critical infrastructure systems [3,4].  
As mentioned above the critical infrastructure system should be characterized 
by specific features which guarantees its fault tolerance in the case of possible 
failure. In particular in the range of executed functions the system architecture is 
a derivative of requirements demanded from them. Let us think over what 
features critical infrastructure system should be characterized by. The analysis is 
begun with the topological parameters. 
The basic principle of the critical infrastructure system functioning is the 
maximal availability assurance of system resources. For this reason applying the 
shared medium topology is considered to be questionable. Certainly a better 
solution would be to apply the direct topologies which guarantee dedicated 
character of connects. In particular, in these systems point to point connections 
can be applied because of traffic routing requirement elimination. Such networks 
are not fault tolerant because it is impossible to set alternative connection links 
in it. The recommended feature of topological structures in the fault tolerant 
systems is preservation of all system topological characteristics besides a 
diameter. But let us notice that as a result of this system class complexity, 
especially of the significant number of nodes it is hardly possible to fulfill the 
above constraint. The topologies of critical infrastructure systems in principle 
are neither symmetric nor regular topologies. Besides, for of the security reasons 
they exclude the need of excessive topology development in order to make it 
symmetric. Other important features of the critical infrastructure systems are 
hardware and software heterogeneity and also data distribution. Heterogeneity is 
based on realization of varied functions by the nodes implemented with the 
varied architecture hardware thereby varied capabilities. The data distribution 
feature is related with the distributed data processing. Data are often gathered 
and shared with the other users directly from the place of their rise. Thus, it is 
necessary to ensure the efficient nodes co-operation in both the mutual data 
sharing process and its processing [4]. 
Mutual relationships between the selected features of the critical 










Fig. 1. Relationships between the features of the critical infrastructure systems 
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3. Reconfiguration as an instrument of preserving fault tolerance 
Reconfiguration is one of basic methods of fault tolerance ensuring in the 
critical infrastructure systems. A special attention was arouse by reconfiguration 
algorithms in the context of distributed computation systems in which a 
significant computation power is achieved by connecting a lot of independent 
processing units. In most of these systems in order to ensure their fault tolerance 
the method is used which allows to apply additional processing units whose aim 
is to take over computation functions from the faulty node.   
If we assume that in the case of occurrence of processing element failure the 
number of computed tasks in a system would be invariable, then it can turn out 
that critical resource of the system is an operating memory. Due to that fact the 
reconfiguration algorithms can be classified from the essential memory size 
point of view that is necessary to continue computation. On the one hand we can 
distinguish algorithms demanding invariableness of the whole system memory 
size but on the other hand, there exist algorithms which demand only memory 
size invariableness of faulty processing element or its neighbor processing 
elements. Other classification is based on specifying changes degree which 
occur directly after failure. In order to ensure the maximally fast system 
reconfiguration it is necessary to minimize the number of changes introduced to 
the system in case of failure occurrence. The above changes concern both the 
interconnection topology and tasks assigned to particular processing elements. In 
order to ensure the presented requirements usually the methods requiring only 
local reconfiguration are applied. In this case only faulty node and nodes directly 
neighboring with it would be subordinate to appropriate reconfiguration. But in 
practice such a method may turn out to be too expensive in application. Due to 
that fact in reconfigurations the idea which is based on the assumption that 
processing elements are gathered in groups to which spare elements are added is 
applied. To increase the universality of presented method it is assumed that spare 
elements would serve not only the group (cluster) for which they were assigned 
but also neighbor processor clusters. On the one hand, such a solution guarantees 
the increase of system reconfiguration speed. On the other hand, it causes the 
decrease of reconfiguration flexibility thereby limits operating reliability of the 
whole system. 
In the light of presented considerations, the reconfiguration algorithms may 
be classified into two groups: local algorithms and global algorithms. In the case 
of local algorithms at the expense of redundancy the maximized reconfiguration 
speed is achieved. Global algorithms guarantee a redundancy optimization that is 
achieved at the expense of reconfiguration range and the realization time.   
In order to realize the presented reconfiguration it is required to apply the 
system architecture with redundancy. We classify the system elements into 
primary elements and spare elements. In the case of primary element failure this 
element is replaced with the spare element.     
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Let us consider the example of system with cluster organization including the 
set of spare elements with hypercube interconnections.   
It is assumed that the computation system is organized in the form of clusters. 
Each of them has a form of hypercube additionally equipped with redundant 
elements. Fig. 2 shows the structure in which except for 16 primary elements 
connected into four-dimensional hypercube, it uses 8 spare elements. The 
connection method of primary elements with the spare ones is presented in 
Fig. 2b. 
 
Fig. 2. Expanded four-dimensional hypercube 
 
Each of the primary system elements may be denoted as , where 
. The spare nodes may be denoted as , where  or 
, 
( , )i j
1 , 4i j≤ ≤ ),0( j 41 ≤≤ j
( , )i 0 41 ≤≤ i . In this way fault tolerant cluster – FTBB (Fault Tolerant Basic 
Block) was constructed. This FTBB cluster consists of 24 elements where each 
primary node  might be replaced with one of two spare nodes  or 
. Now, let us focus on reconfiguration realized in the FTBB cluster.  
( , )i j ),0( j
)0,(i
In the FTBB system there is a possibility of such a system failure that the 
whole system would be out of order. It takes place when none of the spare 
elements  or  would be able to replace the faulty node . 
Regardless of the system reconfiguration type (local, global) the faulty node 
must be replaced with the elements from the FTBB cluster. For example, if the 
node  fails in the first place one should try to replace such a node with the 
node . If the node  is unavailable it should be replaced (if possible) 
with the node . The realization order of the replacing (reconfiguration) is 
free. But it is advisable to work out a certain replacing method. For example, if 
 replacement might begin with the node  or with the node . This 
solution guarantees the optimization of both available spare element 
),0( j )0,(i ( , )i j
( , )i j
)0,(i )0,(i
),0( j
ji < )0,(i ),0( j
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organizations (column, row). Besides it is characterized by significant speed. In 
order to explain the presented reasoning let us consider the following example.  
Let us assume that Fig. 3 shows structure where the following nodes (2,1), 
(2,2), (3,3), (1,2) and (4,2) failed. The failures followed the presented order. If 
the discussed above reconfiguration method is used then reconfiguration scheme 
would look like the presented one in Fig. 3a. It is not difficult to notice that four 
nodes in the case of new failure would not be able to be replaced with the spare 
elements. These nodes are represented in Fig. 3 by double circles. These nodes 
are (1,1), (1,3), (4,1) and (4,3). 
(a) (b)




(4,0) (4,1) (4,2) (4,3) (4,4)
(3,1) (3,2) (3,3) (3,4)
(2,1) (2,2) (2,3) (2,4)
(1,1) (1,2) (1,3) (1,4)
(0,1) (0,2) (0,3) (0,4)
(1,0) (1,1) (1,2) (1,3) (1,4)
(2,0) (2,1) (2,2) (2,3) (2,4)
(3,0) (3,1) (3,2) (3,3) (3,4)
(4,0) (4,1) (4,2) (4,3) (4,4)
 
Fig. 3. Local (a) and global (b) reconfigurations 
 
Applying the global reconfiguration may give the results shown in Fig. 3b. In 
this case only failure of the node (3,2) would not be repairable. Reconfiguration 
may also be used for other topologies like e.g. mesh, torus. It is also acceptable 
to use a much more modest set of redundant elements. Now, let us consider the 
case shown in Fig. 4. 
Fig. 4a shows the graph  representing a distributed system based on the 3 x 
3 torus topology . For a subset 
G
3,3T Z  of  let  denote the subgraph 
induced in G  by the nodes in 
( )V G ( )G Z
Z . Let ( )GN u  denote the set of neighbors of a 
node  in . For example in Fig. 4a, u G (9) {3,6,7,8}GN =  where  is the 3 x 3 
torus topology . If  is the set of faulty nodes in G , then 
G
3,3T F G F−  denotes 
the graph obtained by deleting the nodes and all edges incident on them from G . 
Fig. 4b shows the graph 3,3T {5,9}−  obtained when nodes 5 and 9 become faulty. 
We consider only the node failures. Faulty edges can be modeled as faults in the 
nodes on which these edges were incidental. 
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Fig. 4. Reconfiguration around faults in the torus topology  
with the restricted set of redundant elements 
 
A supergraph  of  is a -fault tolerant realization of G, if for any 
set F of k nodes of G’, 
'[ , ]G k G G k
'G F−  contain a subgraph isomorphic to G. Fig. 4c 
shows an example of a -fault tolerant supergraph  of  presented 
in Fig. 4a obtained by inserting the redundant nodes r
2 3,3'[2, ]G T 3,3T
1and r2, and the redundant 
links. The -fault tolerant supergraph of Fig. 4c is obtained by a construction in 
which the redundant nodes are connected to all the nodes of  and to one 
another. The reconfiguration of this -fault tolerant supergraph around faulty 




1 and r2 directly 
replace nodes 5 and 9, respectively.  
An alternative to constructing k-fault tolerant supergraphs is to partition the 
node set of G into subsets , introduce disjoint sets of k1,..., tV V i redundant nodes 
in each Vi to make the induced subgraph  the k( )iG V i -fault tolerant realization. 
Such a supergraph of G is denoted by  and is said to be a 
 fault tolerant realization of G [5].  
1 2'[{ , ,..., }, ]tG k k k G
1 2{ , ,..., }tk k k
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4. Reconfiguration algorithm  
The basics of the reconfiguration process is the mapping of faulty nodes of G 
onto those fault free including those redundant of G’. The new node labels under 
this mapping determine a fault free copy of G. In such a mapping from  to 
 if node v  is mapped to a node u  the neighbors of  in G have to be 
mapped to a subset of the neighbors of u in G’. Such a mapping in G’ is called a 
G-mapping. In the reconfiguratin method we designate a small subset Z
( )V G
( ')V G v
ν of 
nodes of G’ to which v  can be mapped for reconfiguring around faults. Each 
node u in Zν is called a node mapper of  denoted by v ( )uM v  and Zν the 
mapping set of v  denoted by . A mapping graph ( )mapp v ( )H G  of a graph G is 
a directed graph whose node set consists of all the nodes of G and some 
redundant nodes, and whose edge set is {( , ) : ( ), ( )}u v v V G u mapp v∈ ∈ . A k-
mapping graph is the one whose implied supergraph is k-fault tolerant. A 
mapping set for a node v  of G in ( )H G  is an ordered set  of nodes in 
, such that 
1( ,.., )hv v
( ( ))V H G
1
( )vM v ), 1(jv jM v − , for 1 j h< ≤  and  is the only 
redundant node in this ordered set. A mapping set for a subset Z of  is a set 
of disjoint mapping sets for each node in 
hv
( )V G
Z , none of which contains any node of 
Z.  
M app:= F ;
D enote a ll nodes in  F  as unava ilab le




Let u  be  the  node in  M app
Let w  be  the ava ilab le m apper o f u
Fau lt(w ) ind ica tes the  faulty  node
w hose m app ing se t w  belongs to
S tart
u F∈ Y E SN O
Fau lt(w ):=uFau lt(w ):=Fau lt(u)
M app_set(Fau lt(x)):=
M app_set(Fau lt(u))       w∪ Insert w  m apping set of theappropria te  node  (Fault(w )) in   F
D enote w  as unava ilab le
and rem ove u  from  M app
w
is  an  active
node
M app:=M app      {w }











Fig. 5. An algorithm that finds mapping set for the fault set F in the mapping graph ( )H G  
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The presented mapping set for  specifies a G-mapping which can be performed 
when  is faulty, so that v  is mapped to  which, in turn, is mapped to , and 
so on, until 
v
v 1v 2v
1hv −  is mapped to the redundant node , thus configuring it into the 
new nonfaulty system.  
hv
An algorithm that finds mapping set for k or fewer faulty nodes is presented 
in Fig. 5. This algorithm is based on the theorem which confirms that if each 
node of G is mapped exactly by k, the other nodes in the mapping graph ( )H G  
of G, and ( )H G  are acyclic, then ( )H G  is -mapping graph [5,6]. k
 
5. Conclusions 
In the fault tolerant systems its accessibility is mainly achieved by the 
topological parameters of the interconnection network optimization. Fault 
tolerance may be guaranteed by the reconfiguration of the existing resources so 
that the basic system functional parameters would not change. In such a case the 
system efficiency is possible to get worsen.  
An alternative method is applying of the redundant elements which may be 
used in the reconfiguration process. The use of the large number of redundant 
elements causes the increase of the system fault tolerance without any system 
capacity degradation. However, such a situation results in a significant increase 
of the system realization costs. In the other case when the lower number of 
redundant elements is applied the system realization cost is lower but the system 
capacity degradation increases. Hence, applying of the optimal number of the 
redundant elements in the system reconfiguration process is an issue whose 
solution allows to realize structures with the increased level of fault tolerance by 
the relatively acceptable worsening of capacity parameters and increase of the 
costs [7]. 
The structure reconfiguration of the distributed critical infrastructure systems 
should be realized on the basis of the topologies characterized by the presented 
topological parameters especially regular and symmetric topologies. 
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